OnlinePoker66 Forum : Your daily poker board! - Strategic corner http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/ How to play 99? Suited connectors? Ask questions there or share your knowledge! en Fri, 20 Nov 2009 23:03:19 GMT vBulletin 5 http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/images/misc/rss.jpg OnlinePoker66 Forum : Your daily poker board! - Strategic corner http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/ age http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/age-23263/ Fri, 20 Nov 2009 22:05:30 GMT i started playing poker when i was in the military about 5 years ago,but now im actually go the casions playing seriously. my question is whats a... i started playing poker when i was in the military about 5 years ago,but now im actually go the casions playing seriously. my question is whats a appropriate age to let kids play online poker ]]> Strategic corner liljosh0304 http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/age-23263/ It all looked so good till !!! http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/all-looked-so-good-till-23226/ Wed, 18 Nov 2009 12:38:24 GMT now heres a intresting hand must say when i see the river i was thinking now this fall house looks good but then ....... Everleaf Gaming Game... now heres a intresting hand must say when i see the river i was thinking now this fall house looks good but then .......

Everleaf Gaming Game #116335091
***** Hand history for game #116335091 *****
Blinds 2500/5000 NL Hold'em - 2009/11/18 - 12:15:36
Table fun 6247
Seat 3 is the button
Total number of players: 10
Seat 1: Shrooms ( 1399424.26 )
Seat 2: DirtyGirlie ( 378254.32 )
Seat 3: amigos4444 ( 50000 )
Seat 4: nolakay ( 172500 )
Seat 5: wegski ( 147500 )
Seat 6: roo27 ( 1039099.14 )
Seat 7: frankinstein ( 533479 )
Seat 8: HELLOLV ( 341488 )
Seat 9: johnny18 ( 631940.76 )
Seat 10: royalme ( 235000 )
roo27: posts small blind [2500]
frankinstein: posts big blind [(5000)]
** Dealing down cards **
Dealt to roo27 [ 3h, Qc ]
HELLOLV folds
johnny18 calls [5000]
royalme calls [5000]
Shrooms: lmao
Shrooms calls [5000]
amigos4444 folds
roo27: ;o)
roo27 calls [2500]
frankinstein checks
** Dealing Flop ** [ Td, Qd, Jd ]
roo27: bets [25000]
frankinstein folds
johnny18 folds
royalme calls [25000]
Shrooms calls [25000]
** Dealing Turn ** [ Qs ]
roo27: bets [100000]
royalme raises [205000]
Shrooms calls [205000]
roo27 raises [820000]
Shrooms calls [715000]
** Dealing River ** [ Jh ]
roo27: bets [89099.14]
Shrooms: sorry m8
Shrooms calls [89099.14]
roo27 shows [ 3h, Qc ]a full house, queens full of jacks
royalme does not show cards
Shrooms shows [ 9d, Kd ]a straight flush, king high
Shrooms wins 714999.08 practice chips from main pot with a straight flush, king high [ Kd, Qd, Jd, Td, 9d ] :eek:
Shrooms wins 1608196.21 practice chips from side pot with a straight flush, king high [ Kd, Qd, Jd, Td, 9d ] :eek: ]]> Strategic corner roo27 http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/all-looked-so-good-till-23226/ bad read or bad play http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/bad-read-bad-play-22992/ Tue, 03 Nov 2009 15:03:48 GMT check this and be honest was this bad play by me or just unlucky i was first to act and flat called all folded round to big blind afer flop my... check this and be honest was this bad play by me or just unlucky
i was first to act and flat called all folded round to big blind
afer flop my thinking was no ace in opponents hand otherwise he would of raised preflop,so he bets 1250,my thinking is i have top pair with good kicker so i raised it all in got called big surprise he was playing the bottom pair but hit trips so good for him surprised he played it but he hit was i wrong here
Everleaf Gaming Game #113659276
***** Hand history for game #113659276 *****
Blinds 200/400 NL Hold'em - 2009/11/03 - 14:25:29
Table 1
Seat 3 is the button
Total number of players: 10
Seat 1: fatherof6 ( 1075 )
Seat 2: ubique ( 22262 )
Seat 3: marty46 ( 1505 )
Seat 4: deeessdee ( 1130 )
Seat 5: curtoma ( 4225 )
Seat 6: telboy ( 4320 )
Seat 7: tony_sopran0 ( 4774 )
Seat 8: T_B_H ( 7765 )
Seat 9: norwichrich ( 6900 )
Seat 10: declan55 ( 4430 )
fatherof6: posts ante [$ 25]
ubique: posts ante [$ 25]
marty46: posts ante [$ 25]
deeessdee: posts ante [$ 25]
curtoma: posts ante [$ 25]
telboy: posts ante [$ 25]
tony_sopran0: posts ante [$ 25]
T_B_H: posts ante [$ 25]
norwichrich: posts ante [$ 25]
declan55: posts ante [$ 25]
deeessdee: posts small blind [$ 200]
curtoma: posts big blind [$ 400]
telboy: vn
** Dealing down cards **
Dealt to telboy [ Ks, Th ]
marty46: vnh
norwichrich: vnh
T_B_H: vnh
telboy calls [$ 400]
tony_sopran0 folds
declan55: ty
T_B_H folds
norwichrich folds
declan55 folds
fatherof6 folds
ubique folds
marty46 folds
deeessdee folds
norwichrich: worth a go lol
curtoma checks
** Dealing Flop ** [ Tc, 2s, Ah ]
curtoma: bets [$ 1250]
declan55: always
telboy raises [$ 3895]
curtoma calls [$ 2550]
** Dealing Turn ** [ 2c ]
** Dealing River ** [ 8c ]
curtoma wins 8850 chips from main pot with three of a kind, twos [ Ah, Kh, 2h, 2s, 2c ] ]]> Strategic corner telboy http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/bad-read-bad-play-22992/ Sterno’s playkit #2. Number Cruncher, part one (number of opponents matter a lot) http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/sterno-s-playkit-2-number-cruncher-part-one-number-opponents-matter-lot-22909/ Thu, 29 Oct 2009 03:54:33 GMT Hi all. I like poker numbers. They are very useful, since the games rely largely on understanding them, avoiding mistakes and pushing others... Hi all.


I like poker numbers.

They are very useful, since the games rely largely on understanding them, avoiding mistakes and pushing others to make some consistently over a huge number of hands.


So, I am intending to compile some of my personal documents (ie: notes, charts and other things gathered here or there) and to discuss them here, before embarking on other theory discussions as a kind of reference to discuss matters meanigfully.




This first thread is perhaps a bit abstract but I find it very useful and informative, especially for here.

The next ones will be shorter, and with more concrete examples discuss (or so is the plan).



The tables I discuss here describes ALL the possible combinations taking as a starting point any pre-flop hand, and then the chances of winnings if the hand is played until the river, depending on the numbers of opponents.

The full charts are posted below this blurb.


I find it extremely useful to understand different points, such as the barrenness of slow playing bullets or any top pair or even worse, unpaired premium, preflop.

What these figures show, for example, is that as soon as you have 5 people calling, you have more chances to loose with your AA than to win (though a close call), with KK & QQ it is 4 people, with JJ it is 3, with AK unsuited it is only 2 etc.



More widely, and this is what gets me on the whole the most desperate and leaving tournaments (either just leaving or playing carelessly) is the high number number of callers, even with steep raises because it makes any strategic play impossible.


There is often this argument voiced in the forum when people complain about games quality, saying that patience, patience, time will pay you off if you play sensibly. I never agreed to that point of view.

Of course one calling station is a blessing, two can be as well at times; but as soon as they add-up: there is no way to play any kind of meaningful game. And if you play with the “patience, patience” motto on the long run you will simply be loosing.




In more concrete terms. Imagine a situation we have all experienced I guess (I did so many bloody f-word times):

Early multitable tournament. You get QQ after a long-low-streak (and a few missed cheap calls) that started with your first hand 25 minutes ago.

Finally something chunky: "the ladies":

Hand Rank: 3 of 169 (Top 1.35%)
Deal Probability: 0.45%


Blinds are 25/50. You are in mid position; full table of ten. You get one limper in front of you, so the pot is now 125.

Nobody else has called and it is your turn to speak. Conscious of the loose callling tendencies you produce a steep raise to 350. Pot is 475.

The person after you calls, s/he is just a calling station and thinks his/her Q9 suited is worth being played..

The pot is now 825.

Nobody else calls until the small blind, who is a good player. S/he has a decent stack and an A10 suited. He calls. The move is legit with a chance taken on implied odds, so debatable.

The pot is now 1150 (25 were already paid by the sb).

The big blind doesn’t like his blinds raised and start to see what s/he regard are good pot odds: 300 to add, for odds of almost 1 / 4 and likely 1 / 5, if the last person calls. Playing an average hand is a possible move here, if one has a big enough M (say big stack).
Say s/he has K 10 suited and calls

The pot is now 1450, and the initial limper thinks that his 22 could very well make a huge hit if trips fall on flop, though odds are actually not in favour of calling (1/8th approx chances to hit trips on flop while pot odds are approx 1/5th)


S0 we end up with 5 players out of ten on flop. It is simply a disaster.

Ok: chances of winning this hand are thus:

You (QQ) = 37.9%

The calling station (Q9 suited) = 22.5%

The small blind (A10s) = 26.7%

The big blind (K10 suited) = 25.8%

The initial limper (pocket 2’s) = 15.5%

Sure, you are the favorite. Play in this configuration (approx independently of the specific hands of each) a thousand hands, you will loose 621 times.


Patience doesn’t pay at all.

The game becomes much more luck than skill and looses for me all interest if this repeats. Which it does not that rarely (and often which much worse hands).


And I think this is a crucial point for our beloved OP66 tables.


Notes on the example

1) The percentages exceed 100% when added (128,4%). Such percentages are always calculated perspective-based: in the shoes of the holder one of these pre-flop hands not knowing yet anything else. Just as when one is counting "outs", one can only take into account one's own hand and the community cards on table and not what others hold (Queens, 10's and suits interfere, as well as the proportion of high cards blocking some possible str8's)

For concrete examples and "third omniscient eye" figures adding to 100%, scroll below. 2 examples are discussed (changing the suits a tad to compare)


2) Of course, there is a fallacy in the example given since each hand won't be played until river: some people will fold. But it is more likely than not that you are already beaten on flop:

Chances of overcards hitting pair on flop is approx 15 % for each. There are two of those = 30%. Chances that the pair of 2's hit trips is 12%. Chances for the other players to hit a double pair is 2% each = 8%.
Chances of hitting flush directly when two suited cards = a bit less than 1% (so a total of 3%). Chances that others get trips by getting the same card on flop twice is 1.35 % (5.40% in total, for the 4 other players), then there are the possibilities of hitting striaghts for 3 players or, much less likely yet (but adding up), bigger nuts-monsters, etc., etc.

The total exceeds 50% anyway just on flop independently of any further play.

Now, you might tell that me is a good thing. Say say 43% percent chances to be ahead on flop (a guess, here: didn't compile all the possible combinations and smaller figures that add-up) with 1/5 preflop pot odds. Mathematically, yes. Besides, the fact that you'll likely have draws and all (which could be good for you too). Thing is you manage to get this figure with the 3rd ever best preflop hand. With the rest it of course fares much less. And callers substitute one for another hand after hand for draws, etc, you end up playing a much too random game (to my taste), even if you do make it through and win the hand.

And if you don't, which is more likely than the reverse, well, you will find yourself (in the scenario proposed) with a yellow-orange M, and little options to develop your game further.




Some other things you can see through these tables are:

1) Obviously the weight of having good cards preflop and of playing them well, in terms of raises.

2) The first column (one opponent) is useful to consider for heads-up

3) Meditating on all kind of concrete scenarios looking up these figures is very telling. Especially for end games or low M play (your low M or other player's).


I hope you will find this as interesting as I did. It is a good first base, I think.



:outlaw: :help: :outlaw:



.














:heart: ]]> Strategic corner SternSwiss http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/sterno-s-playkit-2-number-cruncher-part-one-number-opponents-matter-lot-22909/ another Q. http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/another-q-22874/ Mon, 26 Oct 2009 21:46:19 GMT as you were intrested in my other thread and caused a a big discussion im posting another q. your heads up startin stack was 1k you have 900 he... as you were intrested in my other thread and caused a a big discussion im posting another q.

your heads up startin stack was 1k you have 900 he has 1100; hes a tight/aggressive player he raises the blind x3 u have AA the blinds are 25/50 what would you do:

1)preflop?
then flop is 7h ks qs
2)what would u do after flop?
turn is 4s
3)would u do after turn?
river qh
4)what would you do after river?

enjoy :waytogo: ]]> Strategic corner street66 http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/another-q-22874/ Sterno’s playkit #1. Inflection points : The “M” theory (full) http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/sterno-s-playkit-1-inflection-points-m-theory-full-22854/ Sun, 25 Oct 2009 17:11:31 GMT Hiya Friends. In the interesting thread started by street66 some time back (http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/general-poker-question-22360/),... Hiya Friends.

In the interesting thread started by street66 some time back (http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f...uestion-22360/), I exposed bits and pieces of what is known as the “M” theory, as was applicable to the concrete problem proposed in the OP.

Here I will propose and exhaustive overview, for those interested in the more complete picture.

More largely, I will try to post such theory blurbs here every now and then... as some of you know: I love to study and to discuss theory, as the knowledge nerd that I am.



A) The general concept of inflection points


Harrington, on which this presentation is largely based, offers an analogy with football games (American, for him), from the coach’s perspective:

In the beginning of a game, the coach has a general strategy and a very wide array of options to develop. As times passes, and as the result evolve (here negatively), the number of options shrink until some “desesperate” moves might be the only choice left.

Applied to no-limit tournaments, it means that the slow building-up of subtle bets and moves that characterize the early game starts to gradually change into a wild battle of bluffs, desperate all-in moves and climaxxxx-tic showdowns.

But this latter phase if far form being a bingo random process: it is quite strategic, actually and this is precisely what the theory address.

What the Inflection theory proposes are guidelines to tackle different possible configurations, depending on one’s stack, other’s, blinds and antes structures, etc.

The model which I find the most convenient is widely known as the “M” model (or “M-ratio”) invented by Paul Magriel, a great poker & backgammon player (like Gus Hansen).

Harrington has his own model, which he calls “Q”, and which is a bit more difficult to calculate, since one needs the average amount of chips per player left in a tournament (a figure not always easily accessible, especially in RL play). Himslef says that if the two models product conflicting results, one should go with M as it is more powerful, except in the case of qualifying tournaments, where a number of players all get the same prize (a qualification for something) and the others get nothing. I won’t develop Q here, but you can find it explained in Harrington’s book (referred to at the end of this text), in case you often play qualifiers.



B) Ok, Sterno but what is M concretely?

M is a measure of the health of one’s chip stack as a function of the cost to play each round.

In simple terms, a player can sit passively in the game, making only compulsory bets, for M laps of the dealer button before running out of chips.

A high M means the player can afford to wait a number of rounds before making a move and be very selective about them.

A low M means that it’s time for the coach in you to make daring moves, which wouldn’t make sense earlier in the game

A very-low M means desperate moves, such as in the example discussed in street66’s thread I referred to above.


In very concrete terms, M is the ratio of your stack to the current blinds (sb & bb) + the antes (hereafter “the opening pot”)

With less words:

M = one’s stack / [(small blind + big blind + the sum of antes), aka “the opening pot”]


A concrete example:

Blinds are 1000/2000 with antes of 200 and 6 players at the table.

Your stack is 15’000 Chips.

Your M =

15’000 / [3000 + (6x200)] = 15’000 / 4200 = 3.6
(3.571 actually but these decimals do not matter)


It basically indicates how much rounds of the table you can survive passively before being eaten-away by the blinds... in the current situation (blinds raise, tables reconfigure).


I know the figure of 3.6, which is a red zone (see below), and it's strategical implications might seem steep for some of you unfamiliar with the theory (as it was for me at first, before I started to apply it in some RL biggies).

Remember that this theory concerns big league play.

Here, were play is, nolens volens, much more random and loose the theory cannot be considered in the strict sense.... It can only give inspiration.




C) Sure, I understand the general principle but how is that going to help me get shiny medals?


Ok, now that the principle is concretely laid-down, here is the general strategy that the model recommends.

It divides one’s tournament’s situation into FIVE ZONES:


1) The Green Zone (you have 20 or more times the opening pot)

This where you ideally would like to be as much as possible: all options and styles are open to use and switch from: conservative, aggressive, super-aggressive.

In other words: it is where you can be the most functional and versatile and it is worth to take some risks to stay there, according to Harrington.


2) The Yellow Zone (you have 10-20 times the opening pot)

As you slide down, the blinds are starting to affect you and you start to loose the ability to play conservatively.

You have to start, at chosen times, to make moves with weaker hands than a conservative tight style would elect to play with.


3) The Orange Zone (you have 6-10 times the opening pot)

In the yellow zone, you need to play even more aggressive and loose the ability to make moves that require a reasonable stack to succeed.


4) The Red Zone (you have 1-5 times the opening pot)

In the red zone, your only option is to go all-in and to choose when (though you have little time margin) before being eaten-up. Any other bet would consume so much of your stack (on a proper table) that you would be pot-commited anyway and going all in gives you a chance to reload a bit by taking the pot here and then with your first bet.


5) The Dead Zone (you have less than the opening pot... lame-o)

It looks like you are still alive, but the odds don’t see it that way. You are a “gnat to be swatted” (Harrington).

You have one move left: all-in, and when you make it others will most likely call just to get rid of you.

Unless you get the messiah hand, the crucial thing is to make your move in a yet unopened table before the big blind arrives next. By moving first some might not call because of the potential dangers of someone raising after them.

According to Harrington: “The need to move first is so great that your cards really don’t matter anymore”. At all.



D) More on the Green Zone

Well: nothing more to add. You cruise and can play your best game(s) with all options open.

As much as it is possible, avoid sliding down the zones or heat-up the colour spectrum (mel’s panties or the idea of sa11y opening her blouse should take care of that).



E) More on the Yellow Zone

As you slide to yellow-ness, three shifts in strategy occur:


1) As obvious, you start to become more aggressive, both in betting at pots and calling bets. The general pre-flop requirements lower down a bit and you will raise or call with a few more hands than when all is green.

About calling: this is so because others will be adjusting their plays as well and more will be in the same kind of situation.

Make sure to look at other’s M first and then ask yourself if they are indeed modifying their play or not (here chances are they may not). Don’t miss any showdowns so as to understand whether people understand inflection points or not.

Beware of 2 things:
- A good player will never play inflections points mechanically and be predictable.
- a showdown with “normal” strength of hands (as in green zone) do not give you any information (of the kind discussed just above)


2) Much less obvious (even counter-intuitive for me at first) is the fact that you must be much more conservative while playing small pairs, a point true for both yellow and orange zones.

The reasoning lies on implied odds. It is a bit long and complex and, but adamant. I won’t unfold it here, but you can refer to Harrington’s book (pp 133-137).

Same holds true with suited connectors which are also heavily dependent on implied odds.


3) In the yellow zone, you loose the ability to make any “big moves” (much too dangerous for your stack and tournament life) and have to content with “small moves”... that is when you are making moves, which shouldn’t be too often.

A “move” is not necessarily a bluff, but it implies either that (no hand and pure representation) or not much of a hand (bottom pair on flop, for example).


“Small moves”: blending probe and continuation bets, or calls followed by small raises, or bets based on position. The idea with those is too put down pots cheaply without much of a hand, or not at all. Evaluating other players’ manifestation of strength is crucial here and you should ask yourself how they are playing and how they perceive you from the recent table history as well. Since not all of small moves will work you shouldn’t invest a lot in any: just swing your way trying to keep a positive balance (Gus Hansen is an absolute master in that) and wait for the great hands / hits that will allow you to gather a fat load of chippies.

“Big moves”: here you construct big, outrageous (that hopefully won’t be seen) moves, representing strength from the beginning and you keep hammering consequently until everyone lays down. They have a higher rate of success than small moves, but when you loose one, you are in bad shape, unless your stack is huge. That is precisely why being very aggressive with a huge stack is good strategy and nothing like “bingo-player”, as I remember someone calling me once while I was exactly doing that some months back. My chat response was rather dismissive. We have become friends since, in case you wonder.

AS WITH ANY MOVES THOSE SHOULDN’T BE OVERDONE OR YOU WILL BECOME PREDICTABLE.

Overdoing starts at 10 % of played hands for a conservative player and perhaps 25% for an aggressive one, I ‘d say... in serious games. These figures are highly debatable and do not hesitate to do so if you estimate things very differently.



F) More on the Orange Zone

The orange zone is a continuation of the yellow zone, where the previous constraints are intensified.

In this zone you mostly need to conserve your chips, saving them for big decisions that could double your stack. Semi-speculative moves based on good pot odds (implied or regular) become lethal and inappropriate in the orange zone, while they are fine in the green zone, and to a lesser extent in the upper yellow. For such moves, independently of those pot odds that look oh so good, you will be spending a larger and larger proportion of your stack as your M shrinks (which you contribute to if you choose to play this way).

Pot odds are just that: pot odds. You need some stack to play them purposefully, as you do not have anything like the nuts in hand and base your choices on statistics of hitting solely / mostly. That is fine when you can develop a series and absorb a bad-streak (and if you calculate properly). Not if your own nuts are held with a knife by the rest of the table.

Small pairs and suited connectors become even more undesirable as starting hands. Note that this point doesn’t apply to all-in moves, though, but to bets and raises.

A notion that is always important takes a crucial role here: Opening table momentum.

This especially true for all-in moves, where small pairs and good suited connectors regain value... as hopefully should be easily graspable by now (or one of us didn’t do his/her job well, lol).



G) More on the Red Zone

So, in the red zone you have lost the abilty to make anything else but all-in bets and have only little margin as to choose when.

Note that if your M is below 3, you all-in bet will usually fail to drive anyone away since your weakness, the prospect of booting you out for others and interesting odds will result in at least one call.


Corollary questions for decision making (about whether to push all-in or not):

1) Has anyone already entered the pot before you. If yes, you need to be careful and only go all-in with the sort of hands that you would raise up with early in the tournament

2) How good is my preflop hand? The answer to this is much less important than the answer to question 1. In Harrington’s words "I am only folding the very worst hands here. 10-6 off-suit is plenty good enough.


A paradigmatic red zone example is discussed in street66's thread linked to at the top of this page.



H) More on the Dead Zone

You shouldn’t be there, unless you like to flirt with the reaper, but that hasn’t anything to do with poker, but rather your personal kinks.

If you are in the dead zone, as it happens to everyone, it means either you let yourself being blinded away (bad play) or because you made a good move while being-short stacked and got unlucky.

You are basically food for the fishes... Make your prayers.

Of course, sometimes miracles happen and they feel great, but counting on them is naive and silly.

The basic advice here is the same in spirit than the one I would give concerning being bitten by poisonous snakes: avoid getting bitten in the first place.

Or in Harrington’s words: “[Good] players arrive here only by accident”.



I) Additional remarks

According to Harrington, the more your M goes down, the more your M becomes an important factor, every bit as, and finally more, important than the actual cards you are holding.

The danger of playing too tight in the low middle-zones is thus. You wait and wait to get a strong premium, gently getting your stack eaten up by blinds and antes. First there is the risk of never getting anything that good and simply being blinded away. But there is also the risk of getting the desired hand too late.

Ok you waited, waited and waited until you slide in the red zone. Here finally come the desired cowboys (KK): not the messiah, quite likely. You double-up but might very well still be in the red zone. The chance to get another of the best premiums again soon, is very, very low (even with OP66’s “random” generator, lol).



Knowing your own M and pondering your options is the first step, but it is as important to follow other’s M, so as to contribute to your reading of their moves.

An example I gave in the other: slowplaying good hands (more often than not risky if not lousy play) against low M's (that will have to make moves which will be looser than earlier in the tournament) can be actually a fruitful strategy.


Like any theory, you off course have to keep varying your game so as not to be predictable.


To cool-down possible enthusiasm immediately, here is a little example that happened to me recently:

Tournament with approx 80 entrants, late stage (perhaps 13 players left total, our table is 7). The player under the gun goes all-in with a red M of around 4. Nobody calls.

I am in mid-position, with a yellow M. My hand is A 10 off-suit and I think it is more than good enough to call him. I raise to try to ensure no one else calls in the few players yet left to speak and we had up face to face for a showdown.

The git had bullets (AA).... and he doubles up, deservedly so.

The morality is the usual one: nothing is ever guaranteed in our favorite game (not even his bullets which were an 87-13 % favorite against my A 10)

This example is reconstructed by memory. The spirit is here, but a few actual details, not relevant for the theory, might be slightly different (I hadn’t planned on writing this, then, and didn’t take notes).


Finally, inflection points theory has implications in other forms of play than big multi-table tournaments, but it would bring us much too far to tackle them.



Voilà.



I hope some of you found reading this blurb interesting. Please let me know here or via pm if so, because it takes quite some time to sum-up and redact such things, so if no-one gives an excrement... it is a bit useless!



J) Sources

Mostly summed-up from Dan Harrington’s “Harrington on Hold’em. Expert Strategy for No-Limit Tournaments, volume II”, chapter 9

M-ratio - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Dan Harrington - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Paul Magriel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Some personal remarks / insights here and there.


:heart: ]]> Strategic corner SternSwiss http://www.onlinepoker66.com/forum/f8/sterno-s-playkit-1-inflection-points-m-theory-full-22854/